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Abstract
For children, adolescents and educated adults, comparing fractions with common numerators (e.g., 4/5 vs. 4/9) is more challenging than
comparing fractions with common denominators (e.g., 3/4 vs. 6/4) or fractions with no common components (e.g., 5/7 vs. 6/2). Errors are
related to the tendency to rely on the “greater the whole number, the greater the fraction” strategy, according to which 4/9 seems larger
than 4/5 because 9 is larger than 5. We aimed to determine whether the ability of adolescents and educated adults to compare fractions
with common numerators was rooted in part in their ability to inhibit the use of this misleading strategy by adapting the negative priming
paradigm. We found that participants were slower to compare the magnitude of two fractions with common denominators after they
compared the magnitude of two fractions with common numerators than after they decided which of two fractions possessed a denominator
larger than the numerator. The negative priming effects reported suggest that inhibitory control is needed at all ages to avoid errors when
comparing fractions with common numerators.
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Fraction Comparisons
Learning rational numbers, particularly the concept of fractions, is challenging for students (Lortie-Forgues,
Tian, & Siegler, 2015). The acquisition of fraction knowledge in education is important because it constitutes
part of the core knowledge for algebraic, probabilistic, and proportional reasoning (Siegler & Lortie-Forgues,
2014). Indeed, fraction knowledge is predictive of mathematic achievement (Jordan et al., 2013; Siegler,
Thompson, & Schneider, 2011; Torbeyns, Schneider, Xin, & Siegler, 2015). Notably, fractions not only are diffi-
cult for children to master but also remain challenging for adults (for a review, see Vamvakoussi, 2015). Adults
and children typically use different strategies to compare the magnitudes of fractions as a function of the type of
fraction comparison problems with which they are confronted (see, e.g., Fazio, DeWolf, & Siegler, 2016;
Schneider & Siegler, 2010; Siegler et al., 2011; Siegler & Pyke, 2013). In addition, adults tend to represent frac-
tions as discrete magnitudes when simpler strategies are not pertinent (Fazio et al., 2016). Taken together,
these findings are in line with the overlapping wave theory proposed by Siegler (1996). Thus, difficulties in
learning fractions are due to different factors, such as applying whole-number properties to rational numbers or
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applying procedures used in fraction addition (or subtraction) to fraction multiplication (or division; Siegler,
Fazio, Bailey, & Zhou, 2013; Torbeyns et al., 2015). An illustration is given in fraction comparison problems in
which participants consider a fraction as two separate natural numbers rather than one rational number
(Stafylidou & Vosniadou, 2004) in a certain context. For instance, when deciding whether 1/7 is larger than 1/3,
one could erroneously answer that 1/7 is larger than 1/3 because 7 is larger than 3 when considering the frac-
tions as two separate natural numbers.
The natural number bias (Vamvakoussi, Van Dooren, & Verschaffel, 2012), defined as a robust human tenden-
cy to rely on natural number knowledge when working with rational numbers (Ni & Zhou, 2005) could be in part
at the root of systematic errors when comparing fractions with common numerators (e.g., 1/7 vs. 1/3). Because
the concept of a natural number coexist with the concept of a rational number (Chi, 1992, 2005; diSessa, 2008;
diSessa & Sherin, 1998; Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982; Vosniadou, 2013; Vosniadou & Skopeliti,
2014; Vosniadou, Vamvakoussi, & Skopeliti, 2008), the concept of a natural number might interfere with the
concept of a rational number in certain contexts, resulting in a natural number bias. This bias persists from
childhood to adulthood in fraction comparison problems likely because (as with other cognitive biases) it is
highly efficient in certain contexts, such as when the two fractions to compare have the same denominator
(e.g., 4/6 vs. 7/6). In this context, applying natural number knowledge (i.e., that 4 is smaller than 7) when com-
paring 4/6 vs. 7/6, leads to the correct answer that 7/6 (1.16) is larger than 4/6 (0.66). However, it is worth not-
ing that previous studies have demonstrated that natural number knowledge is crucial for mathematical ach-
ievement (Siegler & Lortie-Forgues, 2014) and for the development of conceptual and procedural knowledge of
fractions in particular (e.g., Rinne, Ye, & Jordan, 2017).
Van Dooren, Lehtinen, and Verschaffel (2015) have argued that the systematic difficulty in comparing fractions
with common numerators (as revealed by higher error rates or longer response times) at any age might be roo-
ted in part in our spontaneous tendency to rely on a well-known strategy (i.e., the “greater the whole number,
the greater the fraction” strategy) in a context in which this strategy is not appropriate. Consistent with this as-
sumption, studies have reported that children (Gabriel, Szucs, & Content, 2013a; Meert, Grégoire, & Noël,
2010a), adolescents (Van Hoof et al., 2013), educated adults (Meert, Grégoire, & Noël, 2009, 2010b;
Vamvakoussi, Van Dooren, & Verschaffel, 2012) and experts in mathematics (Obersteiner, Van Dooren, Van
Hoof, & Verschaffel, 2013) require more time to compare fractions with common numerators (i.e., a context in
which the “greater the number, the greater the fraction” strategy is misleading) than with common denominators
(i.e., a context in which the “greater the number, the greater the fraction” strategy is appropriate). While educa-
ted adults tend to rely on “the greater the number, the greater the fraction” strategy to compare fractions with
common components and thus continue to be affected by the natural number bias (Bonato, Fabbri, Umiltà, &
Zorzi, 2007; Meert et al., 2009), they are less affected by it when comparing fractions with different compo-
nents, presumably because this context might trigger to a lesser extent this misleading strategy (Faulkenberry
& Pierce, 2011; Gabriel, Szucs, & Content, 2013b; Schneider & Siegler, 2010; Sprute & Temple, 2011).
According to Alibali and Sidney (2015), several factors could affect the natural number bias observed in fraction
comparison tasks such as the strength and preciseness of rational number representations. They speculate
that the strength of these rational number representations could be dependent on the participant’s experience
with fractions, the delay from the time they last activated this representation and the characteristics of the prob-
lem to solve that might trigger one sort of representation over the other. Cognitive development and schooling
also affects fraction magnitude abilities as rational and whole number representations become increasingly
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more precise over time (see Siegler et al., 2011). However, the fact that even expert mathematicians display a
natural number bias in certain context contradict these findings (Obersteiner et al., 2013).
Taken together, findings from these previous studies tentatively suggest that participants might be more error
prone when comparing two fractions with common numerators because they apply a well-known strategy con-
sisting of choosing the fraction with the greater whole number when the fractions have common components
(i.e., the “greater the whole number, the greater the fraction” strategy). While this strategy is efficient for com-
paring fractions with common denominators, it can leads to systematic errors when comparing fractions with
common numerators. In this context, the present study aimed to determine whether the inhibition of the well-
known “greater the whole number, the greater the fraction” strategy is needed to compare fractions with com-
mon numerators in adolescents and in educated adults as in other types of logico-mathematical problems.
Inhibition of Misleading Strategies During Logico-Mathematical Problem Resolution
According to dual-process theories of human thinking (Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman,
2011), systematic reasoning errors (or reasoning biases) in different domains are rooted, in part, in our sponta-
neous tendency to rely on heuristics (i.e., rapid, parallel, automatic, and effortless strategies). Studies have pro-
vided convergent evidence that inhibitory control is necessary at any age to avoid using a misleading heuristic
in a context in which it interferes with the strategy (or the strategies) leading to the correct answer (see for re-
views Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 1995; Borst, Aïte, & Houdé, 2015; Diamond, 2013; Houdé & Borst, 2015). For
example, studies have demonstrated that the ability to overcome systematic errors in classical developmental
tasks such as in Piaget’s A-B (Diamond, 1998 but see Munakata, 1998 for a working memory account of the A-
not-B error), class-inclusion (Borst, Poirel, Pineau, Cassotti, & Houdé, 2013; Perret, Paour, & Blaye, 2003) and
number-conservation (Houdé & Guichart, 2001; Houdé et al., 2011) tasks is not exclusively rooted in the ac-
quisition of knowledge of increasing complexity (as Piaget assumed, Piaget, 1983) but is also dependent on the
progressive ability to inhibit misleading heuristics.
Importantly, the failure to inhibit a misleading strategy partly explains not only systematic errors in logical Piage-
tian problems but also systematic difficulties faced by children in literacy (Ahr, Houdé, & Borst, 2016; Borst, Ahr,
Roell, & Houdé, 2015; Lanoë, Vidal, Lubin, Houdé, & Borst, 2016), in mathematics (Lubin et al., 2016; Lubin,
Vidal, Lanoë, Houdé, & Borst, 2013) and in science (Potvin, Masson, Lafortune, & Cyr, 2015).
Some studies have already demonstrated that the inhibition of contextual or perceptual cues is needed to com-
pare fractions. For example, Siegler and Pyke (2013) provided evidence that 6th and 8th graders with better
conceptual and procedural knowledge of fractions displayed better performance in an anti-saccade task, a typi-
cal inhibitory control task. More generally, comparing the magnitudes of numbers sometimes requires inhibiting
contextual or perceptual cues, such as the physical size of the number (Henik & Tzelgov, 1982; Szűcs &
Soltesz, 2007). In addition, switching costs have been reported during arithmetic problem solving (i.e., multipli-
cation of whole numbers), with participants displaying poorer performance when switching between two strat-
egies than when using the same strategy in two consecutive trials (Lemaire & Lecacheur, 2010). Switching cost
has been interpreted as possibly reflecting the role of working memory and/or inhibitory control in strategy
choice. However, no study to date has provided evidence that the inhibition of a misleading strategy contributes
to the ability to compare fractions with common numerators across development using a negative priming ap-
proach.
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The Negative Priming Paradigm Adapted to Misleading Strategies
The negative priming paradigm was originally designed by Tipper (1985). The negative priming paradigm rests
on the logic that if a distractor (or a strategy) is inhibited on a given item (i.e., the prime), then its activation on
the following item (i.e., the probe) should be disrupted (i.e., longer response times and higher error rates) in
comparison to a control condition in which the prime does not require inhibition of that strategy (e.g., Borst,
Moutier, & Houdé, 2013; Tipper, 2001 but see Neill, Valdes, & Terry, 1995, for a non-inhibitory episodic retrieval
account of negative priming). Although neuroimaging studies that investigated the neural underpinning of nega-
tive priming used different procedures and different negative priming tasks, there is tentative evidence that the
negative priming effect relies on a similar brain area regardless of the nature of the task (see for a review
Frings, Schneider, & Fox, 2015). Importantly, negative priming elicits activation in the right dorsolateral prefron-
tal cortex (Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Krueger, Fischer, Heinecke, & Hagendorf, 2007; Ungar, Nestor, Niznikiewicz,
Wible, & Kubicki, 2010) and spatially adjacent regions such as the medial and inferior prefrontal cortex (Wright
et al., 2005). These prefrontal areas are closely related to inhibitory control processes (see, e.g., Aron,
Robbins, & Poldrack, 2014). Lesions studies provided convergent evidence for the role of the frontal lobe in the
negative priming effect, with no negative priming effect observed in patients with frontal lobe lesions (Metzler &
Parkin, 2000; Stuss et al., 1999).
Negative priming effects were originally reported in attentional tasks to reveal the inhibition of distractors (e.g.,
Tipper, Weaver, Cameron, Brehaut, & Bastedo, 1991) but now have been reported in numerous tasks in vari-
ous domains to reveal the inhibition of overlearned misleading heuristics (see for a review Houdé & Borst,
2015). Note that the negative priming paradigm adapted to misleading strategies reveals that a misleading heu-
ristic must be inhibited in order to solve a given task but provides no information on the strategy that is activa-
ted once the misleading heuristic has been inhibited (Borst, Moutier, & Houdé, 2013). In the present study, we
used a similar negative priming approach to determine whether the selection of the appropriate strategy to
compare fractions with common numerators relies, in part, on the inhibition of a misleading heuristic as previ-
ously evidenced in other school learning studies (e.g., Ahr et al., 2016; Borst, Ahr, Roell, & Houdé, 2015; Lanoë
et al., 2016; Lubin et al., 2013; Lubin et al., 2016; Potvin et al., 2015). Note that Meert et al. (2009) reported that
adults required more time to compare the magnitude of two natural numbers when preceded by fractions with
common numerators than when preceded by fractions with common denominators. The authors interpreted this
priming effect as an evidence that participants inhibited the selection of the larger denominator when comparing
common numerator fractions. Importantly, the priming effect was only observed when the denominators of the
common numerator factions in the prime matched the natural numbers in the probe which does not provide evi-
dence that the “greater the whole number, the greater the fraction” strategy was inhibited. Moreover, it is difficult
to determine whether the priming effect reported in this study reflect a positive or a negative priming effect. In-
deed, the priming effect could evidence that participants are faster to compare natural numbers when preceded
by common denominator fractions in which they can directly compare the components of the fractions to com-
pare their magnitudes.
The Present Study
In the present study, we designed a variant of the negative priming paradigm originally designed by Tipper
(1985). Our paradigm was designed in such a way that on test trials, the misleading strategy (i.e., the “greater
the whole number, the greater the fraction” strategy) that participants were required to resist (i.e., inhibit) to
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solve the prime item became an appropriate strategy for the probe item. Conversely, in control trials, the strat-
egy necessary to complete the prime item was unrelated to the strategy required to solve the probe item. For
instance, in the test trial, participants had to determine on the prime which of the two fractions with the same
numerator (e.g., 7/4 vs. 7/3, hereafter referred as common numerator items) was the largest. This item typically
required participants to resist (inhibit) using the “greater the whole number, the greater the fraction” strategy
(which would lead participants to erroneously state that 7/4 > 7/3 because 4 > 3). After the prime, participants
had to determine on the probe which of the two fractions with the same denominator (e.g., 8/3 vs. 5/3, hereafter
referred as common denominator items) was the largest, a context in which the “greater the whole number, the
greater the fraction” strategy was appropriate (8/3 > 5/3 because 8 > 3). In the control trial, participants first
decided (on the prime) which of the two fractions (4/3 vs. 4/5, hereafter referred as common-denominator
items) had a denominator larger than the numerator (here 4/5). Then, on the probe, as in the test trial, they
determined which of the two fractions with the same denominator (2/6 vs. 5/6) was the largest, a context in
which the “greater the whole number, the greater the fraction” strategy was appropriate (2/6 < 5/6 because 2 <
5). Regarding the appropriateness of the method, we note that by construction, the negative priming paradigm
requires that the participants succeed above the chance level of performance on the control and test primes for
the priming effects on the probes to be observed. Thus, we tested 9th graders who are able to successfully
compare the magnitude of common numerator items (i.e., the prime in the test condition in our negative priming
paradigm). We also tested young adults because we used age as a proxy of the skill to compare fractions,
young adults being more skilled than 9th graders.
We reasoned that if adolescents and educated adults must inhibit the “greater the whole number, the greater
the fraction” strategy to compare fractions with common numerators, then they should require more time
(and/or commit more errors) when comparing fractions with the same denominator that are preceded by primes
when the participants compared fractions with the same numerator than they did when preceded by primes in
which participants decided which of the two fractions had a denominator larger than the numerator (revealing a
typical negative priming effect). Notably, testing adolescents and adults allowed us to determine (a) whether
educated adults must still inhibit the “greater the whole number, the greater the fraction” strategy when compar-
ing common numerator items and (b) whether the efficiency of inhibiting the “greater the whole number, the
greater the fraction” strategy in that context increases with age. If inhibitory control is required to compare com-
mon numerator items even in educated adults, then we should find negative priming effects in adults. Finally, if
the efficiency in inhibiting the misleading heuristic (i.e., the “greater the whole number, the greater the fraction”
strategy) increases with age, then the amplitude of the negative priming effect should be smaller in adults than
in adolescents, as reported in previous negative priming studies on misleading strategies (e.g., Aïte et al.,
2016; Borst, Moutier, & Houdé, 2013; Lanoë et al., 2016).
Method
Participants
Thirty-six typically developing adolescents (mean age ± SD: 14.6 ± 0.4 years, 17 girls) were recruited from mid-
dle schools in Caen (Calvados, France). All of the adolescents were in Grade 9 and had not repeated a year.
Thirty-three adults (21 ± 1.7 years, 17 women) without cognitive impairment participated in the study. They
were all students from a state university with no selection of the students. Among the 30 adults, 9 were enrolled
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in a BA in science and 21 in a BA in humanities and social sciences (4 in law, 6 in history, 4 in sociology and 7
in psychology). The two groups differed signiﬁcantly in age, t(67) = 21.4, p < .0001, Cohen’s d = 4.91, but not in
sex repartition, χ2(1) = 0.38, p = .53.
By definition, negative priming effects can be observed only if participants accurately compared common nu-
merator items (i.e., the prime in the test condition). Therefore, 15 adolescents (41% of the sample, M = 72.3 ±
19.2% of errors in common numerator items) and 2 adults (6%, M = 63.4 ± 4.8 of errors in common numerator
items) were excluded from the analysis because they performed at chance levels of performance. Moreover,
we excluded one adolescent and one adult because their average RT exceeded the average RT of the group
by more than 3 SD. Thus, analyses were conducted on 20 adolescents (mean age: 14.6 ± 0.3 years, 9 girls,
M = 16.3 ± 13.5% of errors in common numerator items) and 30 adults (mean age: 21 ± 1.8 years, 14 women,
M = 16 ± 16.2% of errors in common numerator items). The gender distribution did not differ between the two
groups, χ2(1) = 0.01, p = .90.
Written consent was obtained after a detailed discussion and explanations were given. Parental written consent
was obtained for the adolescents, who were tested in accordance with national and international norms that
govern the use of human research participants. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision
and were native French speakers. All adolescents attended the same middle-school, and all adults attended
the same university in Caen, France, serving a diverse population with a wide range of socioeconomic statuses
and cultural backgrounds.
Materials
Each item consisted of a visual presentation of two fractions on a computer screen (in 50-point black Arial font
on a white background). Between the two fractions, a question mark was displayed. We designed three types
of items: common denominator items, common numerator items and denominator-numerator items. In the com-
mon denominator items (e.g., 2/4 vs. 5/4) and common numerator items (e.g., 4/2 vs. 4/5), participants were
asked to determine which of the two fractions was the largest. Importantly, participants could rely on the “great-
er the whole number, the greater the fraction” strategy to determine which of the two fractions was the largest
for the fractions with common denominator items, whereas they could not use it for the common numerator
items. In the denominator-numerator items, we asked participants to determine which of the two fractions pos-
sessed a denominator larger than the numerator. Critically, the inhibition of the “greater the whole number, the
greater the fraction” strategy was not needed to solve the denominator-numerator items. Note that the two frac-
tions presented in the denominator-numerator items had the same numerator (e.g., 4/2 vs. 4/5) as the common
numerator items because the two types of item served as primes in the control and test trials of our negative
priming paradigm, respectively. We designed fractions in each item using numbers between 2 and 9 for numer-
ators and denominators (see Appendix - Fraction design). We presented 24 items (eight of each type) for the
practice trials and 96 (32 common denominator items, 16 common numerator items, and 16 denominator-nu-
merator items) for the experimental trials.
Procedure
We tested participants individually in a quiet room on a laptop with a screen resolution of 1366 x 768 pixels.
Stimuli were presented using E-prime 2.0 (Psychological Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, USA). Participants
started by completing 24 practice trials (8 for each type of item) to familiarize themselves with the three types of
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items and the response pad. Feedback was provided regarding whether their answers were correct. To prevent
familiarizing participants with the prime-probe sequences, the three types of items were presented in blocks,
starting with the common denominator items and finishing with the common numerator items. Next, participants
performed 32 experimental trials (16 test and 16 control trials) consisting of pairs of primes and probes during
which no feedback was given on the correctness of the responses. In the test trials, participants performed a
common numerator item (as a prime) and then a common denominator item (as a probe). In the control trials,
participants performed a denominator-numerator item (as a prime) followed by a fraction with a common de-
nominator item (as a probe; see Figure 1). Trials were presented in a random order, with the exception that no
more than two test or control trials could occur successively. Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation
point followed by a presentation of the type of comparison participants needed to perform on the next item. The
question was displayed at the top of the screen in blue and red 24-pt Arial font for half the participants and red
and blue font for the other participants, respectively. Then, two fractions were displayed with a question mark in
between the two until participants provided an answer. Participants pressed the left (or right) button of the
mouse to indicate that the fraction on the left (or the right) of the question mark was the larger one (or had a
denominator larger than the numerator). Response times (RTs) were recorded from the onset of the fractions to
the button press. Immediately after participants pressed one of the two response buttons, a fixation cross ap-
peared, followed by a presentation of the type of comparison to perform on the next trial. Finally, two fractions
and a question mark were displayed until a response was provided. In between each trial, a 450 x 450 pixel
blurred jpeg image was displayed in the center of the screen to limit the transfer of processes from one trial to
the next. No judgment was required on these images.
Figure 1. Experimental design. Participant responds by pressing the left or the right button to indicate her or his fraction
choice. Items were presented in French.
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Given that we were interested in potential priming effects, we standardized the sequence of responses between
the primes and the probes in both the test and control trials. The four possible pairs of response sequences
occurred two times in both the test and control trials (i.e., ‘left’ on the prime problem then ‘left’ on the probe
problem, ‘left’ then ‘right’, ‘right’ then ‘left’, and ‘right’ then ‘right’). Note that participants needed to switch from
one strategy to another between the prime and probe items in both types of trials; thus, any difference in pro-
bes’ RTs between the control and test trials does not simply reflect switching costs as the ones reported in
Lemaire and Lecacheur (2010)’s study.
Results
All analyses of RTs included only data from trials in which participants responded correctly on the prime and the
probe. Outliers were defined as RTs greater than 2 SDs from the mean for such participants on the probe items
(or the prime items) in the test (or the control) trials. Outliers occurred on 6.7% of trials in adolescents and 6.8%
of trials in adults. After removing outliers, participants’ errors and RTs were averaged separately for the prime
and probe items on the test and control trials (see Table 1).
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of ERs (%) and RTs (ms) in Adolescents and Adults
Item Trial
M (SD)
Adolescents Adults
Included (n = 20) Excluded (n = 14) Included (n = 30) Excluded (n = 2)
ERs (%)
Prime Test 16.3 (13.5) 72.3 (19.2) 16 (16.2) 63.4 (4.8)
Prime Control 12.5 (10.1) 15.6 (22.9) 6.4 (9.9) 3 (4.2)
Probe Test 9.7 (8.2) 27.7 (22.1) 7.9 (11.5) 12.5 (17.7)
Probe Control 12.2 (12.9) 28.1 (23.7) 8.7 (11.8) 31.3 (8.8)
RTs (ms)
Prime Test 3080 (960) 2612 (1082)
Prime Control 1751 (693) 1288 (487)
Probe Test 2729 (863) 2420 (1010)
Probe Control 2538 (859) 2287 (960)
Negative Priming 192 (392) 134 (426)
Note. See Appendix for the comparison of included and excluded adolescent ERs and RTs.
When computing the error rates (ERs) on the probe, we included only data from trials in which participants re-
sponded correctly on the prime. We conducted separate 2 (type of trials: test or control) x 2 (age: adolescents
or adults) analyses of variance (ANOVAs) of the ERs and the RTs for the prime and probe items. For each of
the analyses, we report the effect size either in the ANOVA (partial eta squared) or in terms of the difference of
the means (Cohen’s d). When testing the absence of an interaction effect (which were the effects of interest in
our study), Bayesian statistics were used to provide an estimate of the evidence in favor of the null (BF01) or the
alternative (BF01) hypothesis. The Bayes factor indexes the extent to which observed data are supported by
one model over another. For example, a Bayes Factor (BF01) of 3 in favor of the null hypothesis means that the
observed data are 3 times more likely to have occurred under the null than the alternative hypothesis (Jeffreys,
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1961). We also provided for the critical interaction hypotheses on the probe items an interpretation of the Bayes
Factor according to Jeffreys (1961)’s cutoffs. Bayesian Analyses were performed using the JASP software (Ver-
sion 0.8.3.1) with a default Cauchy prior width of r = 0.707. Note that BFs reported for the interaction reflect the
BF of the full interaction model over the main effects model only. Note that because the distributions of the ERs
were not normal (all ps <.01) but the assumptions of homoscedasticity were confirmed (all ps > .30), we ran
non-parametric ANOVAs when analyzing ERs on the primes and on the probes.
Primes Analyses
Non parametric one-way (Kruskal-Wallis) and repeated measure (Friedman) ANOVAs on the prime ERs re-
vealed a main effect of the condition, χ2(1) = 6.74, p < .01, BF10 = 19.86, but no effect of age, χ2(1) = 1.07,
p = .30, BF01 = 2.44, and no two-way interaction, χ2(1) < 1, BF01 = 0.17. Adults and adolescents committed
more errors when comparing fractions with common numerators (test trials: 16.2 ± 2.1%) than when deciding
which fraction had a denominator larger than the numerator (control trials: 9.5 ± 1.2%).
A two-way mixed design ANOVA of the RTs revealed a main effect of the type of trial, F(1, 48) = 112.35, p
< .0001, ηp2 = .70, BF10 = 5.36 x 1012 - with participants requiring more time to perform common numerator
items (M = 2846 ± 150 ms) than denominator-numerator items (M = 1519 ± 83 ms), and a main effect of age,
F(1, 48) = 5.05, p = .03, ηp2 = .09, BF10 = 1.16 - with adults (M = 1950 ± 131 ms) faster than adolescents (M =
2415 ± 161 ms) - but no two-way interactions, F < 1, BF01 = 21.71. Analyses on the type of strategy used by the
participants to solve common numerator items and the effect of improper fractions on this comparison can be
found in the Appendix.
To determine whether participants required more time to compare two fractions in which one of the two was an
improper fraction in common numerator items and whether age modulated this effect, we performed two addi-
tional ANOVAs on the prime RTs and ERs of the test trials. A two-way ANOVA of the RTs revealed that partici-
pants required less time to solve common numerator items in which one of the two fractions was an improper
fraction (M = 2942 ± 1151 ms) than to solve common numerator items in which both fractions were improper or
both fractions were not improper (M = 2673 ± 916 ms), F(1, 48) = 8.62, p = .005, ηp2 = 0.15, BF10 = 11.24, but no
effect of age, F < 1, BF01 = 2.23, and no interaction between age and the type of fraction, F < 1, BF01 = 5.84,
were observed. A similar ANOVA of the ERs revealed no effect of the type of fraction, χ2(1) < 1, BF01 = 1.53, of
age, χ2(1) < 1, BF01 = 2.25 and of interaction between age and the type of fraction, χ2(1) < 1, BF01 = 5.04 for
the interaction.
Probes Analyses
Non parametric one-way (Kruskal-Wallis) and repeated measure (Friedman) ANOVAs on the probe ERs re-
vealed no effect of the condition, χ2(1) < 1, BF01 = 2.81, no effect of age, χ2(1) = 1.41, p = .24, BF01 = 1.97, and
no two-way interaction, χ2(1) < 1, BF01 = 11.46, suggesting a strong evidence in favor of the null hypothesis
(i.e., the observed data are more than 11 times more likely to have occurred under the null than the alternative
hypothesis). Given that we found no main effect of the type of trials on the ERs, any negative priming effect
reported on RTs is unlikely to be due to speed/accuracy trade-offs.
A similar ANOVA on the RTs revealed a main effect of the type of trial, F(1, 48) = 7.46, p < .01, ηp2 = .13, BF10 =
4.25, but no effect of age, F(1, 48) = 1.12, p = .29, BF01 = 1.48, and no two-way interaction, F < 1, BF01 = 3.20.
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Note that the Bayes Factor of the interaction suggests moderate evidence in favor of the null hypothesis (i.e., it
is about 3 times more likely that there is no difference than a difference in the amplitude of the negative priming
effects between adolescents and adults). Importantly, we found that adolescents and adults required more time
to perform common denominator items preceded by common numerator items (test trials: M = 2730 ± 863 ms
for adolescents and 2421 ± 1010 ms for adults) than those preceded by a denominator-numerator item (2538 ±
859 ms for adolescents and M = 2287 ± 960 ms for adults): t(19) = 2.08, p < .025, Cohen’s d = 1.07 for adoles-
cents and t(29) = 1.77, p < .05, Cohen’s d = 0.73 for adults (see Appendix for the effect of improper fractions on
the negative priming effects reported).
Primes Versus Probes Analyses
Finally, to verify whether adults and adolescents had more difficulty with common numerator items than with
fractions with common denominator items, we conducted a 2 (type of fraction: common numerators vs. com-
mon denominators) x 2 (age: adolescents vs. adults) mixed-design ANOVA on ERs and RTs. To conduct this
analysis, we included ERs and RTs for primes in the test trials (i.e., common numerator items) and for probes in
the control trials (i.e., common denominator items). Note that we did not include ERs or RTs for probes in the
test trials because performance was potentially affected by the prime. Participants required more time in deter-
mining which of the two fractions was largest when the two fractions had the same numerator (i.e., primes in
the test trials) than when the two fractions had the same denominator (i.e., probes in the control trials), F(1,
48) = 31.11, p < .0001, ηp2 = .39, BF10 = 5621.25 but we found no main effect of age, F(1, 48) = 1.74, p = .19,
BF01 = 1.32, and no significant interaction between the type of fraction and age, F(1, 48) = 1.96, p = .17, BF01 =
1.88. Non parametric ANOVAs on the ERs revealed a main of type of trials, χ2(1) = 7.53, p = .006, BF10 = 3.69,
but no main effect of age, χ2(1) < 1, BF01 = 3.28, and no two-way interaction, χ2(1) < 1, BF01 = 3.02.
Discussion
In the present study, we investigated (a) whether inhibitory control is required to compare common numerator
items in adolescents and educated adults and (b) whether the efficiency to inhibit the misleading heuristic (i.e.,
the “greater the whole number, the greater the fraction” strategy) that leads participants to be biased when
comparing common numerator items (i.e., the natural number bias) increases between adolescents and adults.
In line with previous studies on adolescents (Van Hoof, Lijnen, Verschaffel, & Van Dooren, 2013) and educated
adults (Meert et al., 2009; Vamvakoussi et al., 2012), we found that adolescents and adults required more time
and were less accurate in comparing common numerator items than common denominator items, with adults
being generally more efficient than adolescents. We suspect that formal instruction and familiarity with rational
numbers might be the cause of the difference observed between adolescents and adults in the present study.
One could argue that adults and adolescents might be slower at performing common denominator than com-
mon numerator items because they are more familiar with the former than the latter. Although this might be a
possibility when rational numbers are first introduced in the mathematical curricula in 4th grade, by Grade 9 and
later, students are most likely equally familiar with both types of problems. Thus, we suspect that the difficulty to
compare common numerator items in adolescents and adults might be related in part to their tendency to rely
on the “greater the whole number, the greater the fraction” strategy whenever fractions possess common nu-
merators, even in a context in which this strategy is misleading such as with fractions with common numerators.
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The present study offers an opportunity to go a step further in explaining which process might allow an individu-
al to overcome errors when comparing fractions with common numerators. Indeed, we found that adolescents
and adults required more time to compare common denominator items after they had just succeeded in deter-
mining which of the two fractions with common numerators was larger than after they succeeded in determining
which of the two fractions had a denominator larger than the numerator. Taken together, our results suggest
that adolescents and educated adults must inhibit the “greater the whole number, the greater the fraction” strat-
egy when comparing common numerator items. Although the ability to inhibit the “greater the whole number,
the greater the fraction” heuristic might contribute to the ability to compare fractions with common numerators,
inhibiting contextual or perceptual cues, such as the physical size or the location of the number (see, e.g.,
Szűcs & Soltesz, 2007), might also be important to compare such fractions.
One could wonder why we did not include a classical inhibitory control task in the present study to show that
inhibitory control was involved to solve common numerator items, as in previous studies (see, e.g., Siegler &
Pyke, 2013). A limitation of such a correlational approach is that none of the classical inhibitory control tasks
assess individual differences in the ability to inhibit a misleading strategy. Thus, the lack of correlation between
performance in a classical inhibitory control task and a fraction comparison task does not necessarily reflect
that inhibition plays no role in the choice of strategy used to solve the fraction comparison task. On the other
hand, the negative priming paradigm has been widely used to demonstrate that inhibitory control is required
within a given task to overcome misleading heuristics, and a growing number of studies have successfully ap-
plied this paradigm to demonstrate the role of inhibitory control over misleading heuristics in various domains
including various school learnings (see, e.g., Aïte et al., 2016; Ahr et al., 2016; Lubin et al., 2013; Lubin et al.,
2016; Borst, Moutier, & Houdé, 2013). In addition, the negative priming approach alleviates some of the short-
comings of pure correlational approaches (e.g., lack of causal evidence, directionality of the association repor-
ted).
By comparing the performance of adolescents and adults on a negative priming paradigm adapted to fraction
comparison, our findings shed light on the development of fraction comparison skills by showing that inhibitory
control is needed at all ages to avoid errors when comparing fractions with common numerators. Previous stud-
ies have argued that the amplitude of negative priming effects might reflect the ability to inhibit a specific heuris-
tic in a given context (Houdé & Borst, 2014, 2015). Indeed, studies have reported that the amplitude of negative
priming effects decreases with age between childhood and adulthood, such as in a verb-inflection task (Lanoë
et al., 2016), in a revised version of Piaget’s class-inclusion task (Borst, Poirel, Pineau, Cassotti, & Houdé,
2013) or in a spatial perspective-taking task (Aïte et al., 2016), which has been interpreted as reflecting the in-
creasing ability to inhibit a specific misleading heuristic in each of these domains.
In contrast with these findings, the amplitude of the negative priming effects in our study did not differ between
adolescents and adults, which might suggest that the inhibition of a componential processing strategy might be
already largely efficient in ninth graders. This finding is consistent with the fact that we did not find that knowl-
edgeable adolescents were less efficient than adults at comparing common numerator items. Note that other
studies have also reported no difference in the amplitude of negative priming effects with age (Lubin et al.,
2013; Pritchard & Neumann, 2009). A possible explanation as to why some studies but not others reported a
difference in the amplitude of the negative priming effects with age might be due to the type of inhibitory control
needed in different contexts. Indeed, some authors argue that we should draw a distinction between intentional
inhibitory control and automatic inhibitory control (Lechuga, Moreno, Pelegrina, Gómez-Ariza, & Bajo, 2006).
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According to this view, whereas intentional inhibitory control is an executive function mediated by the prefrontal
cortex (Aron, 2007), automatic inhibitory control relies on automatic processes sustained by brain structures
that mature earlier (Lechuga et al., 2006), which would explain the lack of a difference in the negative priming
amplitude with age in some contexts. This automatic inhibitory control could potentially appear following intense
training (Jasinska, 2013). Indeed, much as one can automatize the activation of a strategy after an intense
training, one can potentially automatize the inhibition of a strategy. We argue that the inhibition process (to re-
sist the “greater the whole number, the greater the fraction” strategy) involved in the comparison of fractions
with common numerators might be automatized in some students as early as ninth grade, presumably due to
intensive schooling on fractions.
We note that using the “greater the whole number, the greater the fraction” strategy to compare fractions with
common elements might be a byproduct of the mathematics curricula used in primary school. Indeed, in pri-
mary school, simple fractions are first introduced as tools for solving problems that cannot be solved by relying
on whole numbers, such as when children need to understand that the “whole” can be divided into n equal
parts (e.g., a pizza can be divided in 6 equal parts, each of them representing 1/6 of the pizza). Thus, children
start by manipulating and comparing fractions with common denominators before fractions with common nu-
merators or with no common components. Starting the curricula with the manipulation of fractions with common
denominators, a context in which the “greater the whole number, the greater the fraction” strategy is an efficient
strategy, might promote the implicit transfer of the properties of whole numbers to fractions. This might explain
why inhibition of the “greater the whole number, the greater the fraction” strategy is available at all ages to com-
pare fractions with common numerators. Our finding complements other findings reported in literacy (Ahr et al.,
2016; Borst, Ahr, Roell, & Houdé, 2015; Lanoë et al., 2016), mathematics (Lubin et al., 2016; Lubin et al., 2013)
and science (Potvin et al., 2015) and provides additional evidence that inhibition might be a core mechanism of
learning at school (for reviews see Houdé & Borst, 2015).
The lack of difference in the amplitude of the negative priming effects should be taken with caution given that it
can be generalized only to adolescents who succeeded in inhibiting the “greater the whole number, the greater
the fraction” strategy when comparing common numerator items. The comparison of adolescents included and
excluded from the final sample revealed that excluded adolescents had greater difficulty than included ones
solving common numerator and common denominator items. Thus, excluded adolescents might have a lower
understanding of fractions in general. That said, we note that they displayed above-chance levels of perform-
ance only when performing common denominator items, which suggested that they might be more prone to use
the “greater the whole number, the greater the fraction” misleading strategy in this specific context (see Appen-
dix for the details of the analyses).
Our findings suggest that difficulty in inhibiting the “greater the whole number, the greater the fraction” heuristic
might contribute to the difficulty comparing fractions with common numerators, but other factors also contribute
to such difficulty. Indeed, a number of studies have provided evidence that a lack of conceptual and procedural
knowledge on fractions contributes to the specific difficulties in comparing common numerator fractions (e.g.,
Fazio et al., 2016; Schneider & Siegler, 2010; Siegler et al., 2011; Siegler & Pyke, 2013). Children’s difficulties
with fractions have motivated interventions to improve fraction knowledge (Fujimura, 2001; Gabriel et al., 2012;
Moss & Case, 1999). The challenge for fraction instruction is to help children understand that magnitudes are a
property of not only whole numbers but all real numbers (Siegler et al., 2011). In line with previous studies
showing that pedagogical interventions based on inhibitory control learning are more efficient at overcoming
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systematic errors in logical reasoning (Houdé et al., 2001; Rossi et al., 2015) or in mathematical reasoning
(Rossi, Lubin, Lanoë, & Pineau, 2012; Lubin, Lanoë, Pineau, & Rossi, 2012) than more traditional pedagogical
interventions, we suspect that students’ understanding of fraction can be improved by using pedagogical inter-
ventions based in part on learning to inhibit the “greater the whole number, the greater the fraction” heuristic
when comparing fractions with common numerators.
A potential limitation of the present study is that participants were asked to perform a different task on the prime
items in the control trial (i.e., determine which of the two fractions has a denominator larger than its numerator)
than for all other items (i.e., determine which of the two fractions is the largest). We asked participants to per-
form a task of a different nature on the prime in the control trial to prevent the strategy being used in the prime
items priming the strategy to use on the probe items. However, one could argue that the switching costs be-
tween the prime and the probe might differ between the test and the control trials. If so, the negative priming
effect could be a consequence of the difference between the switching costs induced by switching between two
strategies while performing the same tasks (i.e., comparing the magnitude of fractions) in the test trials and the
ones induced by switching between two tasks (i.e., deciding which of the two fractions has a denominator larger
than its numerator or which of the two fractions is the largest) in the control trials. However, previous studies
reported either no difference in switching costs when switching within the same task or between two tasks (e.g.,
Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994) or greater switching costs when switching between two tasks than within the
same tasks (e.g., Philipp, Kalinich, Koch, & Schubotz, 2008). Thus, it is unlikely that the negative priming effect
reported in the present study is a byproduct of the difference in switching costs between the control and test
trials.
In addition, one could argued that providing feedbacks during the practice trials could constitute a minimal form
of education to the participants and thus change their spontaneous choice of strategy. That said, we note that
even if feedback was provided in the practice trials, 41% of adolescents and 6% of adults were excluded be-
cause they performed at chance in the negative priming paradigm. Thus, the comparison of fractions with com-
mon numerators remains challenging even after receiving feedbacks, which is consistent with the difficulties
faced by students at school in this academic learning.
Moreover, the use of single digit numerators and denominators in the common denominator and common nu-
merator items might have encouraged participants to rely more systematically on the “greater the whole num-
ber, the greater the fraction” heuristic. Indeed, previous studies demonstrated that the use of a holistic process-
ing strategy increases when fraction comparison tasks include fractions with two digits components and a wider
range of numbers (see, e.g., Schneider & Siegler, 2010).
The sample size constitutes another clear limitation of the present study. Indeed, the sample size might be too
small to detect a significant age effect on the amplitude of the negative priming effect. Thus, the lack of differ-
ence in the amplitude should be interpreted with caution despite the fact that the sample size (after exclusion of
participants) was determined pre-hoc on the basis of previous negative priming studies that used similar sam-
ple sizes and reported significant effects of age on the amplitude of the negative priming effect (Borst, Moutier,
& Houdé, 2013; Lanoë et al., 2016). Note that the Bayes statistics on the interaction effects on the probe re-
sponses times and error rates do not entirely alleviate the sample size issue given that they only showed that
evidence for the null hypothesis was moderate (i.e., three time more likely to occur than the alternative hypoth-
esis).
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In light of these potential limitations, future studies are needed to investigate whether similar negative priming
effects can be observed (a) when different prime items are designed in the control trials (b) when no feedbacks
are provided in the practice trials, and (c) when a wider range of numbers including two digits number is used to
generate the fractions and whether these negative priming effects would vary with age on a larger sample size.
Moreover, we need to better understand the role of improper fractions on the emergence of the negative pri-
ming effects in the context of fraction comparison (See Appendix for the analyses of the effect of the improper
fractions).
Finally, the degree to which our findings can be generalized to the general population must be considered, giv-
en that the participants performed no standardized math test. We note that our sample of adolescents and
adults might be representative of their respective parent populations because adolescents were all in Grade 9
in a middle school serving a diverse population (with none of them repeating a year), and adults were under-
graduates in a public university serving a diverse population who all obtained a high-school diploma before at-
tending the university.
In conclusion, our study provides the first evidence that inhibitory control is needed in adolescents and educa-
ted adults in order to compare fractions with common numerators, as revealed by a negative priming paradigm
consistent with studies showing that fraction knowledge is associated with executive functions (Jordan et al.,
2013; Namkung & Fuchs, 2016; Siegler et al., 2012). In addition, our findings provide converging evidence that
inhibitory control might be one of the core mechanisms of cognitive development and school learning (for a re-
view, see Houdé & Borst, 2015).
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Appendix
Fraction Design
Fractions were designed so that the average distance based on the magnitude of the fractions did not differ between the
common numerator items (M = 0.65 ± 0.71) and the common denominator items (M = 0.61 ± 0.51), t < 1 and so that the
distance did not differ between the denominators in the common numerator items (M = 2.7 ± 1.9) and the numerators in the
common denominator items (M = 2.5 ± 1.4), t < 1 (see Table A.1).
Table A.1
Pairs of Fractions Presented on the Prime and the Probe of the Test and Control Trials
Prime Probe
Control Test Control Test
6/7 6/3 7/2 7/8 7/3 9/3 3/7 5/7
5/4 5/8 2/7 2/9 7/3 5/3 8/6 2/6
5/3 5/7 3/7 3/2 4/3 8/3 5/3 8/3
6/2 6/9 5/7 5/6 2/9 4/9 4/6 3/6
4/9 4/2 6/5 6/3 7/5 6/5 8/7 9/7
7/8 7/5 9/7 9/4 4/5 3/5 9/8 6/8
7/2 7/9 4/5 4/7 2/6 5/6 3/4 6/4
5/6 5/2 9/7 9/8 7/4 2/4 4/8 6/8
3/2 3/4 2/3 2/4 4/7 6/7 7/8 4/8
6/4 6/7 4/9 4/3 3/2 7/2 8/5 9/5
7/9 7/6 8/6 8/5 7/2 5/2 9/5 3/5
8/3 8/9 7/4 7/3 8/2 9/2 3/2 7/2
6/8 6/5 5/3 5/8 3/6 5/6 4/9 2/9
4/3 4/8 6/8 6/7 5/9 4/9 2/9 6/9
5/9 5/4 3/2 3/6 9/4 6/4 8/6 7/6
4/5 4/3 8/7 8/9 7/4 5/4 5/7 3/7
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Strategies Used to Compare Common Numerator Items
To determine the type of strategy used by adults and adolescents in common numerator items, we computed the correlation
between the RTs and either the distances between the magnitudes of the fractions or by the distance between the two de-
nominators of the two fractions in the pairs. We reasoned that if participants computed the magnitudes of the fractions to
compare them, RTs should be correlated with the distance of the magnitudes of the fractions but not with the distance be-
tween the denominators and vice versa if participants compared the denominators of the fractions. In adults, we found a
significant correlation between the RTs and the distance between the magnitudes of the fractions, r(4) = -.92, p = .01, but
not between the RTs and the distance between the denominators of the fractions, r(4) = -.67, p = .15 (see Figure 2 A and
C). In adolescents, neither of the two correlations reached significance, r(3) =.19, p = .76 between RTs and the distance
between the magnitudes of the fraction and r(4) = .33, p = .52 between RTs and the distance between the denominators of
the fractions (see Figure 2 B and D).
Figure 2. Mean RTs for each of the 6 different numerical distance between the denominators of the fractions (A for adults
and B for adolescents) and for each of the 6 different numerical distance between the magnitude of the fractions to compare
(C for adults and D for adolescents). Dot in red was considered an outlier (steam-and-leaf plot procedure) and was
excluded from the correlational analysis.
Taken together these results suggest that adults required less time to perform common numerator items as the distance
between the magnitudes of the two fractions increased but not as the distance between the denominators of the two frac-
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tions increased. This pattern of correlations suggests that adults most likely computed the magnitudes of the two fractions
to compare them, which is in line with Schneider and Siegler (2010) study that evidenced that multiple strategies can be
used by adults to compare fractions. For adolescents, response times were not related to the distance between the magni-
tudes of the two fractions or the distances between the numerators of the two fractions. Thus, it is not entirely clear what
strategies were used by the adolescents to perform the common numerator items.
Effect of Improper Fractions on Common Numerator Items Comparison and Negative Priming
Effects
Six pairs of fractions on the prime of the test trials contained one proper and one improper fraction. Given that comparing
such pairs could be performed without accessing the magnitude of the fractions but by choosing the fraction in which the
numerator was higher than the denominator, participants might rely on different types of strategies when performing these
pairs than pairs of fractions in which both of the fractions were improper or both were not improper. To determine whether
participants required more time to compare two fractions in which one of the two was an improper fraction in common nu-
merator items and whether age modulated this effect, we performed two additional ANOVAs on the prime RTs and ERs of
the test trials. A two-way ANOVA of the RTs revealed that participants required less time to solve common numerator items
in which one of the two fractions was an improper fraction (M = 2942 ± 1151 ms) than to solve common numerator items in
which both fractions were improper or both fractions were not improper (M = 2673 ± 916 ms), F(1, 48) = 8.62, p = .005, ηp2 =
0.15, BF10 = 11.24, but no effect of age, F < 1, BF01 = 2.23, and no interaction between age and the type of fraction, F < 1,
BF01 = 5.84, were observed. A similar ANOVA of the ERs revealed no effect of the type of fraction, χ2(1) < 1, BF01 = 1.53,
of age, χ2(1) < 1, BF01 = 2.25 and of interaction between age and the type of fraction, χ2(1) < 1, BF01 = 5.04 for the interac-
tion.
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